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Abstract
Ladyman et al (2007) proposed a model of the implementation of
logical operations by physical processes in order to clarify the exact
statement of Landauer’s Principle, and then offered a new proof of the
latter based on the construction of a thermodynamic cycle, arguing
that if Landauer’s Principle were false it would be possible to harness
a machine that violated it to produce a violation of the second law
of thermodynamics. In a recent paper in this journal, John Norton
(2011) directly challenges the consistency of that proof. In the present
paper we defend the proof given by Ladyman et al against his critique.
In particular, contrary to what Norton claims, we argue that the pro-
cesses used in the proof cannot be used to construct a cycle that enacts
erasure in a thermodynamically reversible way, and that he does not
show that the processes used in the proof violate the Second Law of
Thermodynamics.
1 Introduction
There is a consensus among physicists that there is a connection between
information processing and thermodynamics (see, for example, Blundell and
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Blundell (2010), and this is foundational to work in work in other areas of
physics, including, for example, cosmology (Lloyd 2002). In particular, it
is standardly thought that logically irreversible computations can only be
implemented by thermodynamically irreversible processes. This is known as
Landauer’s Principle, hereafter LP, the quantitative form of which says that
there is an entropy increase of k ln 2 associated with the resetting of a single
bit of data in a computational device. John Norton (sometimes together with
John Earman) has repeatedly criticised this consensus and argued that the
purported proofs of both the qualitative and quantitative forms of LP are
not sound (see Earman and Norton 1998, 1999, and Norton 2005). Norton’s
critique led Charles Bennett (2003) to concede that LP cannot be used to
show that there cannot be a Maxwell Demon. It also exposed deficiencies
in the extant discussions of LP in the wider literature, demonstrated that
LP could not be established by reasoning about particular cases, and showed
that a general proof of LP had not been given. Ladyman et al (2007), here-
after LPSG, proposed a model of the implementation of logical operations by
physical processes in order to clarify the exact statement of LP, and then of-
fered a new proof of the latter based on the construction of a thermodynamic
cycle, arguing that if LP were false it would be possible to harness a machine
that violated it to produce a violation of the second law of thermodynam-
ics. In a recent paper in this journal (2011), John Norton directly challenges
the consistency of that proof. He also gives a number of arguments that he
takes to undermine the foundations of the thermodynamics of computation
(against which he also argues in his (forthcoming)). In the present paper we
reply to Norton and defend the proof given by LPSG against his critique.
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2 The Connection between Logical and Ther-
modynamic Irreversibility
LPSG proposed an analysis of the implementation of computation by phys-
ical systems in order to clarify exactly what LP says and to provide a basis
for its evaluation and proof. They argue that much of the confusion in the
literature results from a failure to clearly distinguish between logical trans-
formations and the physical processes that implement them, for example, by
loosely talking about logically irreversible processes. To be clear, we empha-
sise that a logical transformation is a mathematical entity not a physical one.
Physical processes are the direct subject of thermodynamics which applies
to computations only derivatively via applying to the processes used to im-
plement them. Once this distinction is made it is obvious that it makes no
sense to talk of the implementation of a logical transformation by a physical
process, rather, in so far as logical transformations are implemented using
physical systems, they are implemented by families of physical processes. For
example, it is not correct to talk of ‘the erasure process’ because, depending
upon what the input state is, a different member of the family of physical
processes will occur. In general, if a logical transformation is a single-valued
map L from a finite set X of input states, into a finite set Y of output states,
then it will be implemented by a family of physical processes equinumerous
with the number of logical input states.1 (For example, in the case of RESET
there are two input states usually labelled 0 and 1.) We say that a logical
transformation, L, is logically reversible if and only if L : X → Y is a one-
to-one (injective) mapping. Hence, with a reversible logical transformation,
we can uniquely reconstruct the input state from the output state. If L is
not a one-to-one mapping, we say that it is logically irreversible. For the
physical system to implement the logical transformation reliably, the family
1Like LPSG, we are only concerned with deterministic computation and not with prob-
abilistic operations such as Maroney’s RAND (2005).
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L−−−→ y∥∥∥ ∥∥∥
Din(x) −−−→
ΛL
Dout(y)
Figure 1: An illustration of the relationship between the logical states x and
y and their representative physical states Din(x) and Dout(y), showing the
logical transformation L and the physical time evolution operator ΛL.
(reproduced from Ladyman et al 2007)
of processes must take each of the physical states that represent the logical
input states to the appropriate physical state, that is the one that represents
the right logical output state.
This is all summarised in the definition of L-machine given by LPSG. The
key features of their analysis are briefly reviewed below.
To physically implement a logical transformation, we require: A physical
device, D, a specification of which physical states of that device correspond
to the possible logical states (we call the former representative states), and
a time evolution operator of that device. We refer to this combined system
as an L-machine.
The time evolution operator, ΛL must generate the relevant family of pro-
cesses, and the reliability of the implementation consists in the time evolution
operator being such as to ensure that whichever of the representative physical
states the device is prepared in, it ends up in the appropriate representative
state.
LPSG emphasised that everything about the behaviour of the device must be
incorporated into the time evolution operator and external agents may not
intervene during its operation. In particular this prohibits any such external
agent affecting the time evolution of the system by making use of information
about its state while it is running.
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An L-machine {D, {Din(x)|x ∈ X}, {Dout(y)|y ∈ Y },ΛL} physically imple-
ments L in the following sense. If D is prepared in the input state Din(x)
corresponding to the logical input state x ∈ X, and is then evolved using ΛL,
it will be left in the output state Dout(y) corresponding to the logical output
state y = L(x) ∈ Y . We will denote this physical process by px.
A process p is thermodynamically reversible if and only if ∆Stot(p) = 0, where
Stot is the total entropy of the whole system.
If ∆Stot(p) > 0, the physical process p cannot be run in reverse, as the reverse
process p′ would have ∆Stot(p′) < 0, and hence violate the second law. We
therefore refer to any process p for which ∆Stot(p) > 0 as thermodynamically
irreversible. As is well known, there are a number of formulations of the
second law that are provably equivalent to this, modulo certain assumptions.
The other one to which we will refer is the Kelvin statement of the second
law according to which there is no cyclic process whose sole effect is the
conversion of heat into work (see Uffink 2001, p. 328).
A family of physical processes is thermodynamically irreversible if and only
if at least one of its members is.
LPSG’s proof uses these definitions to establish the connection between log-
ical irreversibility and thermodynamic irreversibility as follows. LP can be
stated precisely as the claim that if L is logically irreversible then any L-
machine will use a thermodynamically irreversible family of physical pro-
cesses to implement L.
3 Norton’s Critique
In Norton (2011), John Norton argues that LPSG’s proof is not sound for two
reasons. The first is that, according to him it is possible to use processes from
the above thermodynamic cycle to violate the Second Law of thermodynamics
5
(hereafter SL). Hence, in effect, where LPSG argue that LP must be true by
reductio, because assuming its negation plus the admissibility of a certain set
of processes entails the violation of SL, Norton argues that inferring the truth
of LP is fallacious because the processes entail the violation of the second
law on their own. Hence, his first charge is that LPSG are inconsistent in
affirming both that their processes are admissible and SL. He argues that the
processes in question violate SL in two principle ways. Firstly, he claims that
a different cycle can be constructed with them that violates SL. Secondly, he
claims that one process in particular violates the second law. In sum, then
where LPSG claim that p1 ∧ ...p4 ∧ ¬LP ` ¬SL (where p1..p4 are premises
asserting that the respective processes P1..P4 are admissible) and so infer
that LP is true, Norton argues that {P} ` ¬SL making LPSG’s inference
to LP gratuitous.
Norton’s second objection to the soundness of LPSG’s proof is that according
to him, their cycle can be adapted to provide an example of ‘dissipationless
erasure’ which is his term for an implementation of RESET that is thermo-
dynamically reversible in direction contradiction of LP. In what follows we
first explain the cycle the Norton constructs as the basis of his discussion and
how it relates to the cycle used by LPSG. We then list the processes used, be-
fore arguing that Norton uses a particular kind of ‘controlled operation’ that
differs from any of those used by LPSG, and which is inadmissible. Hence,
we argue that Norton’s counterexample fails, and that if it is reconstructed
using admissible processes used by LPSG then it reduces to reset of known
data which is logically reversible and so not a counterexample to LP. We also
argue that the processes that LPSG regard as admissible do not violate the
second law, and that Norton’s cycle that violates SL cannot be constructed
from admissible processes.
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3.1 Norton’s cycle and the LPSG cycle compared
Norton constructs a modified version of the cycle that LPSG use in their
proof which he claims is a particular case of their cycle, where the device is
also a one-molecule gas in a box. As a consequence of this, the two states
of the device in step 2 (ML and MR), have the same entropy. From this
characterisation he then constructs a list of processes with the aim of:
1) Showing these processes are inconsistent with asserting the 2nd law.
2) Using these processes to construct 2 counterexamples; ‘dissipationless era-
sure’ and reset by the repeated removal of the partition.
Initial conditions: A one-molecule gas occupies the whole box, B. The
device is initially in ML.
Step 1 (same as LPSG): A partition is inserted into the box.
Step 2: A controlled operation is performed on the device depending on
the position of the molecule in B, a) If the molecule is found on the LHS,
the device is set to the LHS (this means doing nothing as an action is only
triggered if the box molecule is found on the right).
b) If the molecule in the box is found on the RHS, the device is set to
right hand.“ The shift is performed by a reversible thermodynamic process.
Since the thermodynamic entropies of ML and MR are the same, no heat
passes to or from the surroundings.” (Norton 2011, p. 188) (This step is
uncontroversial and the same as in LPSG’s cycle.)
Step 3 (same as LPSG): A controlled operation is performed on the box
depending on the state of the device, a) If the device is in the state ML, the
piston inserted on the RHS.
b) If the device is in state MR, the piston is inserted on the LHS.
Step 4: “The erasure process is performed. It transforms the memory device
from the probabilistically mixed state of ML or MR with equal probability,
to the initial state of ML” (ibid)
Norton’s cycle is intended to use exactly the same set of processes as those
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Figure 2: A diagram of Norton’s cycle
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that LPSG use in their’s. In the next section we list them and discuss how
his usage of them differs from LPSG.
3.2 List of Admissible Processes
Process 1a: Isothermal expansion. This a reversible process that takes place
at constant temperature; a piston is inserted and the gas does work on it,
increasing the volume of the gas. The amount of work done by the gas is equal
to the heat flow from the reservoir to the gas. In an isothermal expansion to
twice its initial volume, the work done by the gas is −kT ln 2.
Process 1b: Isothermal compression. A reversible process at a constant tem-
perature. The piston reduces the volume of the gas. The work done on the
gas by the piston is equal to the heat delivered to the heat bath. The work
done by the piston is −kT ln 2.
Process 2a: Removal of the partition. The partition (which traps the gas on
one side of a box) is removed. (There is no heat flow.)
Process 2b: Insertion of the partition. The partition is inserted trapping the
gas in a smaller volume.2 We will assume the partition is inserted halfway
along the box. (There is no heat flow.)
(These two processes are used by LPSG just as Norton says they are.)
Process 3a: Detection. The location of the molecule can be determined
without the detection incurring any thermodynamic cost.
Process 3b: Detect and Trigger. “According to the whether the outcome of
a detection is L or R, processL or processR, respectively, may be initiated,
2Clearly, a distinction is needed here. Our gas consists of only one molecule so inserting
a partition in the middle of the box will compress the gas to half its volume with certainty.
However, in a many molecule gas the probability of the gas being compressed to half the
volume is very small.
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without the initiation passing heat to the heat bath, where these are any two
admissible processes.” (ibid, p. 189)
The key difference and infidelity to LSPG is Norton’s use of process 3b.
Process 3b is a controlled operation: if the control state is detected to be X,
then perform process pX on Z. If the control state is detected to be Y, then
perform process pY on Z. This process is used in step 2 and 3 of both LPSG’s
cycle and Norton’s particular case. However, in step 4 of Norton’s cycle he
performs a controlled operation on the same state.
Further, a controlled operation on the same state is a crucial step in his
counterexample of ‘dissipationless erasure.’ This counterexample proceeds
by using the next process.
Process 4: Shift. “If a system has states M1 or M2 of equal thermodynamic
entropy, then a shift process moves the system from one state to the other
without passing heat to the heat bath.” (ibid)
In LPSG, the shift process is used in step 2. However, in step 2, which process
happened to the device (representing the target bit) depended on the state
of the gas (representing the control bit). On the other hand, Norton’s cycle
uses ‘shift’ in his fourth step, in such a way that whether the location of the
molecule is shifted (the target bit) depends upon the location of the molecule
(the control bit), because the state of the device is used to represent both
bits. Hence, in Norton’s cycle shift is used as a ‘controlled operation’ by part
of the system on itself.
So Norton replaces the above step 4 with step 4*: “If the memory device
is measured to be in state MR, a shift process is initiated that moves the
molecule from the state MR to state ML with equal thermodynamic entropy
by a process that passes no heat to the heat bath.” (ibid)
The second counterexample resets a memory device initially in either ML
or MR to ML. Norton says “the process detects whether the molecule is
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trapped in the right side of the chamber. If it is, the partition is removed
and replaced” (ibid, p. 190). This process is repeated until the molecule is
detected on the left (the probability become overwhelmingly high (≈ 0.999)
after 10 repetitions). However, this process might not be successful in reset-
ting and as such it does not correspond to a logical transformation, rather it
is a probabilistic operation taking MR to ML or MR each with a probability
of 1
2
. As such, this is not a counterexample against LPSG who state in their
premises that they do not consider probabilistic transformations. This is also
a ‘controlled operation’ on the same state: which action (remove partition or
nothing) is performed on the device, depends on the state of the same device
(molecule on LH or RH side).
Whether you can perform a ‘controlled operation’ on the same state is pivotal
to the success or failure of Norton’s reply. In the next section, we argue that
this is not possible.
4 Responding to Norton’s Critique
In the first subsection below we consider controlled operations and the partic-
ular operation that Norton uses in his critique, arguing that it is not among
the operations that LPSG use, and that it is in any case inoperable and not
rightly called a ‘controlled operation’ in the sense in which the term is usually
meant hence the scare quotes above. In the second subsection we consider
Norton’s arguments that the processes LPSG use are inconsistent with the
second law of thermodynamics and argue that each of them fails.
4.1 Controlled operations
Controlled operations are commonly discussed in the literature. A controlled
operation is a logical transformation that maps an input state of at least 2
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bits to an output state of at least two bits in such a way that how one of the
bits, the target bit, is transformed depends on the value of the other bit, the
control bit. The most commonly discussed example of such an operation is
CNOT which has the following truth table, where bit1 is the target bit and
bit2 is the control bit.
Input1 Input2 Output1 Output2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1
The heart of the Norton’s objections lies in the fact that his cycle requires
that a controlled operation can be implemented by a physical system that
has only one degree of freedom which must therefore be used to represent
both the target bit and the control bit. On the contrary, LPSG are explicit
that “the same bit cannot be both the control and the target of a controlled
operation” (Ladyman et al 2007, p. 23 note 7).
In particular, considering Norton’s alleged counterexample of a cycle using
LPSG’s processes that violates SL, step 4* requires that a controlled opera-
tion be performed from a physical degree of freedom to itself. That is instead
of:
Targetin Controlin Targetout Controlout
Z 0 p0(Z) 0
Z 1 p1(Z) 1
we have:
Targetin Controlin Targetout Controlout
0 0 p0(0) 0
1 1 p1(1) 1
In the first table which process px occurs depends only the value of the control
bit. This table implicitly contains another two rows as the physical system Z
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which represents the target bit can be in two different states. However, the
second table cannot have an additional two rows, as the same physical state
represents both the target and the control bit. Further, unless both p1 and
p0 are ‘do nothing’ then the physical state that previously represented the
control bit does not exist after the transformation.
However, it makes no sense to allow which bit a physical degree of freedom
represents to change during the processes that implement a computation.
Furthermore, for physical degrees of freedom to represent different bits they
must be independent of each other. This is because, for a physical system to
represent a set of n bits it must have sufficient, i.e. 2n, different configurations
of its degrees of freedom. For example, if the only two alternative states for
a one molecule gas are BL molecule trapped on the LHS, or BR (trapped
on RHS) then it does not make sense to say this represents 001010 as this
string represents 6 bits of information and the system would need at least
26 different configurations. If this were not so the different bits could not
vary independently of each and that they do so is what makes them different
bits in the first place. For example, there is a difference between having four
different logical states a, b, c, and d, and having four different configurations
of two bits 11, 10, 01 and 00. While in each case there are four possible states,
they are computationally different because they involve different alphabets.
The former four states cannot be used as inputs to AND or CNOT whereas
the latter four can. It is crucial to the identity of logical transformations
whether or not they map the former set of input states to output states
or the latter. Accordingly, when we consider physical states that represent
logical states in the context of implementation, it matters whether the former
are composed of independent degrees of freedom because otherwise measuring
one bit cannot be done without measuring all of them. Equivalently, it would
not be possible to make a process that transforms a bit according to some
rule the same regardless of the value of other bits. In the particular case of
CNOT, it is required that the physical process that transforms the target bit
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depend only on the value of the control bit and not on the value of the target
bit itself (Z).
For example, the four different input rows of CNOT could be physically
represented by a pin on four different places on a chess board (here we do
not have independent degrees of freedom). Since there are two different
positions corresponding to the single value of the control bit, which physical
process acts on the system depends on the value of both bits, not just the
control bit.
There is another reason why different bits cannot be represented by the
same physical state at different times, namely that to allow them to do
completely trivialises the physical implementation of logical transformations.
For example, consider COPY. If relabelling is allowed no physical change in
a system is required for it to implement COPY because we simply stipulate
that whatever state the physical degree of freedom happens to be in now
represents the state being copied.
Norton’s alleged counterexample relies crucially on the use of a process that
consists in a degree of freedom performing a ‘controlled operation’ on itself.
Norton claims to show that allowing P1 to P4 plus PN entails that LP is false.
However, PN is not among the processes that LPSG use. Their controlled
operations are standard because their inputs consist of a control bit and a
target bit represented by two distinct physical degrees of freedom, and their
outputs also consist of two distinct physical degrees of freedom that also
represent the control bit and the target bit where the former is in the same
state as before. Norton’s ‘controlled operation’ is not of this kind because the
control bit is not represented at all at the end of the operation. Furthermore
PN entails that LP is false without the rest of the cycle. This is because
an instance of PN would be RESET in a thermodynamically reversible way
as follows. Consider a memory device with a single degree of freedom. If
it can perform a controlled operation on itself then let that operation be
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to do nothing if the state is 0 and to perform SHIFT if it is in the state
1. Since, doing nothing and shift are both thermodynamically reversible
then PN entails not-LP and hence the rest of Norton’s cycle using LPSG’s
processes is redundant. Hence, where Norton claims p1 ∧ ... ∧ p4 ∧ pN `
¬SL actually pN ` ¬SL. It is clearly question-begging in the dialectical
context to assume the use of a process that on its own entails not-LP. In any
case, such controlled operations are not controlled operations in the sense in
which CNOT and COPY, since there is no degree of freedom representing
the controlled bit at the end of the operation.
Norton claims that the idea of ‘controlled operation’ from a degree of freedom
to itself is vindicated since a robot may be posited to enact it. However,
contrary what Norton supposes, any such robot would have internal degrees
of freedom that would store the state of the control bit (the state of the
device), thereby effectively remembering the state of the target bit, and hence
requiring resetting for a cycle to be completed. It is also arguable that such
‘controlled operations’ of a degree of freedom on itself are not viable because
any operation would require an auxiliary system whose internal state would
determine which operation was performed. For example, a piece of paper
that says ‘destroy me’ cannot read and destroy itself but would have to be
destroyed by a system that read it, that is copied it, first.
In order to reconstruct PN from processes that are used by LSPG, a copy of
the state of D (which is acting as the control and target bit) must be taken.
This ensures that there is a distinct physical state representing the control bit
that continues to be represented after the physical process has acted upon the
target bit. At the end of the cycle this state must then be reset. However,
if LP were false, this reset would be unproblematic as the ‘dissipationless
erasure’ procedure could then be implemented to perform it.3 However, this
amounts to the reset of known data, and LSPG made it clear (p. 22) that it
is agreed on all sides that reset of known data can be done without increasing
3This does then just amount to asserting LP is false.
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entropy because it is logically reversible. As Feynman (1996, p. 144) says
“If we know the atoms position, then we expend no energy in resetting,
irrespective of where the atom starts out.” Thus, he says it is only unknown
data to which has a cost associated with resetting: “Only if we do not know
which side of the compartment the atom is in do we expend free energy.”
(Ibid.) As shown in LPSG (p. 23), the reset of known data is actually the
logical transformation ‘UNCOPY’ which is logically reversible. As shown by
Bennett (1973), logically reversible transformations can be physically realised
in a thermodynamically reversible way and are irrelevant to LP which is only
concerned with logically irreversible transformations.
Elsewhere Norton (2012) uses a distinction between known and ‘random
data’ that is commonly found in the literature (Leff and Rex (200. For
‘random data’ the molecule may be found on the LHS or the RHS, where as
an example ‘known’ data would be a string of devices with the molecule on
the LHS (reset to zero). This is a bizarre definition. Why would whether the
state of one device is known or not depend on the state of other devices?4
In contrast, LSPG make the distinction between known and unknown data
in the following way for a device, D, that contains both a register R and a
memory M (which can be read). If the physical states of R and M represent
the same logical state, the data contained in the device is known. If the states
of R and M are not correlated, then the data is unknown.
We can operationally define whether a physical state represents known or
unknown data. For physical states representing known data, process 1a can
happen as the physical state representing the memory bit acts as the control
bit to determine which side the piston should enter from. For unknown data,
before process 1a can occur the location of the molecule (whether it is on the
LHS or RHS) must be detected and stored in the memory (which then acts
4Note it is misleading to talk of ‘thermalised data’ being represented by the molecule
occupying the whole chamber as such a state does not really represent data at all rather
it is more like an empty register.
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as the control bit).
By taking a copy of the state in order to perform step 4, there is a memory
(the copy) which is correlated with the register to be acted upon (the detected
state). Thus, so reconstructed, Norton’s erasure process acts on known data:
a process established to be thermodynamically reversible (as it is logically
reversible).
In the light of the above, we conclude that Norton’s alleged counterexample
fails to exhibit a violation of LP. If his cycle does violate LP it is simply
because he assumes the admissibility of a process (PN), that LPSG do not
use, and which is sufficient on its own to violate LP. If we reconstruct Norton’s
process using only LPSG’s processes then it is not RESET of unknown data
and hence not a counterexample to LP.
4.2 Does the ‘standard inventory’ of processes allow
for violation the second law?
As mentioned above, even if this alleged counterexample fails, Norton has a
separate argument against LPSG, namely that the processes that they use,
which as he notes, are standardly employed in the literature (Bennett 2003),
allow for violation of SL. If this is true then it is no surprise that these
processes conjoined with the assumption of the falsity of LP entail violation
of SL, and of course one could not conclude from an argument to that effect
that LP must be true after all. In particular, LPSG argue that there is
a missing entropy that must come from the RESET of the device in their
cycle, but if the processes they use violate SL then that missing entropy is
accounted for by them alone and is an artefact resulting from accounting for
the difference between the entropy reducing processes and the assertion of
the SL. Norton therefore charges LSPG with inconsistency since he alleges
they assume SL, while also using a set of processes that allow for violations
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of it. It is important to note that this charge of inconsistency has a wider
scope; if these processes (which are widely used in the literature do indeed
allow for violation of SL then they cannot be used for any proof of LP that
follows the sound horn of Earman’s and Norton’s dilemma.
4.2.1 A second law violating cycle?
Norton constructs a cycle as follows:
Initial state: The molecule occupies the whole box.
1) The partition is inserted, trapping the one-molecule gas on one side of the
partition. Process 2b
2) The piston is inserted, and the gas does work in an isothermal expansion.
Process 1a
The gas has returned to its initial state so a cycle has been constructed whose
sole outcome is the conversion of heat to work: a violation of SL.
However, the above cycle is inoperable. In order to know on which side to
insert the piston, one needs to know which side the molecule is on. But
Norton faces a dilemma. Either there is an agent outside the system that
determines on which side to insert the piston, or not. If the former, then
this cycle is irrelevant since everything that determines the time evolution
of the device must be contained within it as argued at length by LPSG and
reiterated above. On the other hand, if there is no external agent then the
cycle uses a ‘controlled operation’ of a degree of freedom on itself which
we argued above is not possible, and in any case, the assumption that it
is possible entails that LP is false and is therefore question-begging in this
context.
Again, in order to make this cycle operable using admissible processes, there
must be a distinct physical state which controls from which side the piston
enters. This cannot be just some arbitrary state; it needs to be different
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depending on which side of the partition the molecule is, so that the piston
entering will varying accordingly. In order for the process to be cyclic, this
‘control state’ must be reset to its initial state and by LP, there is a thermo-
dynamic cost associated with this. Hence, this revised cycle doesn’t violate
SL.
4.2.2 The partition problem: process 2b
Even if all his other arguments fail, Norton also objects to LPSG’s proof on
the grounds that one of the processes they admit, namely 2b above, itself
violates SL. If the processes involved are thermodynamically reversible, the
entropy difference between two states A and B, S(B) − S(A), should be
independent of the path between them. If state A is the gas occupying the
entire box, and state B the gas occupying half the box then we expect the
entropy difference to be the same regardless of the reversible process taken
to reach one from the other. As such, prima facie, we would expect the
entropy difference between A and B to be the same regardless whether the
volume was halved via a isothermal compression or by inserting the partition.
However, in step 1 of the cyclic process, inserting the partition is assumed
not to change the entropy of the gas.5 In contrast, isothermally compressing
the gas reduces its entropy by kT ln 2 (along with a corresponding increase
of the entropy of the heat bath).
So does inserting the partition decrease the entropy of the gas? As SL is
statistical, it holds that on average the entropy does not decrease. For a
many-molecule gas composed of n molecules, it is very unlikely (Pr = 1/2n)
that all the molecules will be on one side when you insert the partition.
Therefore, in this case inserting the partition is not a violation of SL. How-
ever, for a one-molecule gas the volume it can occupy will be halved with
5The temperature of the gas doesn’t change either, as whilst the volume has halved
the pressure has doubled: pV = nRT .
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certainty.
Premise 1: Inserting the partition is a reversible process that halved the
volume of the one molecule gas with certainty.
Premise 2: The entropy difference between two states A and B is the same,
regardless of path taken (provided thermodynamically reversible processes
are used).
Premise 3: Isothermally compressing a gas reduces the entropy of the gas
by kT ln 2 and increases the entropy of the heat bath by kT ln 2.
Premise 4: The state Bcompression (the gas isothermally compressed to half
the box) is the same as state Bpartition (the gas reduced to half its original
volume by inserting the partition).
Conclusion: Inserting the partition reduces the entropy of the gas by kT ln 2
with certainty: a violation of SL.
However, LPSG can reject premise 4. There is an important distinction
between Bpartition and Bcompression; in the former case you do not know which
side of the box the particle is confined to. By considering the statistical
mechanical definition of entropy: S = k
∑
i pi ln pi, where pi is the probability
for the system to be state i.
S = k
∑
i
pi ln pi (1)
The entropy associated with the box in state A can be written:6
−Sbefore/k = pL ln pL + pR ln pR (2)
When you compress the gas isothermally with the piston entering from the
right, pL → 1 and pR → 0. Thus, (as ln 1 = 0), S(Bcompression) → 0. As
6There is no fundamental reason to split the box in 2, rather 3 or any other number,
but 2 allows for an easy comparison with state B.
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expected, the entropy of the gas has decreased (and that of the heat bath
has increased).
However, the case of inserting the partition is different, since one does not
know which side the molecule is on. Because of this, S(Bpartition) = k(pL ln pL+
pR ln pR). Hence, contrary to what Norton’s says, inserting the partition does
not change the entropy of the gas. Hence, premise 4 is false and the partition
does not violate SL.
It may be objected that the only difference is that in the final state Bcompression
one does know which side the gas is trapped on, whereas in the partition
method the final state Bpartition is equally likely to be on the right or left,
and that this difference is solely in our epistemic position, rather than a dif-
ference in the state properties of the gas. Further, it seems that any difference
in the information content of the system (if information is a some way a prop-
erty of the system) only applies on average. For the ‘average’ state Bpartition
there is a difference in the information (compared to the state Bcompression).
But is hard to see what ‘information’ about the state Bpartition on the LHS is
different from the ‘information content’ of the state Bcompression just because
the former could have been on the RHS. Unlike a quantum superposition,
there is a matter of fact whether the gas is on the LHS or RHS.
However, by returning to some familiar phenomenological concepts such as
work and heat the difference between state Bcompression and state Bpartition can
be elucidated. The key difference is how you can extract work from the two
states. In order to do an isothermal expansion, you need to know which side of
the box the molecule is on to know whether to insert the piston on the left or
right hand side. Given 100 systems in the state Bcompression, you can extract
work from all of them. However, given 100 systems in the state Bpartition half
of the time you will have inserted the piston on the wrong side, doing work
(as you are compressing the gas) rather than extracting work. This is why
the fact that Bpartition could have been on the other side is relevant: there
21
is no one procedure to extract work from Bpartition with certainty.
7 Norton
questions why we should think that whether we know about which state a
device is in affect matters. But it does matter: thermodynamics is about the
properties of matter and how we can exploit or use these properties to do
work. Knowing what state a device is in changes which operations you are
able to perform.
Norton does not acknowledge this difference and so allows (via process 3b)
that the position of the particle in Bpartition can be detected and the piston
inserted accordingly. Thus, on Norton’s view, work can be extracted from the
state Bpartition. However, this view is mistaken as it would involve performing
‘controlled operations’ on the same state. As shown earlier, this is not possi-
ble and therefore the insertion of the partition does not violate the Kelvin ver-
sion of the second law, in addition to not violating the information-theoretic
version (because the information-theoretic entropy does not decrease).
There is a further way to consider whether the insertion of the partition de-
creases the entropy and therefore violates SL, namely by reference to Clau-
sius’ equation. The Clausius equation directly relates entropy to heat flow,
as discussed in Norton section 2.2, and we could use it to argue that there is
no entropy change through the insertion of the partition because, unlike an
isothermal compression, there is no associated heat flow. Hence, if we assume
that the entropy of a system only changes if there is a heat flow, then the in-
sertion of the partition does not change the entropy. However, he argues that
the Clausius formula is not valid in this context because the entropy change
between the initial and final states in question is not path-independent, since
if the volume of the gas is halved by inserting the partition then a different
entropy change (0) is associated with the state than if the path is isothermal
compression (kln2). However, if we regard the final state as only being the
7The above example also helps to further illuminate the statistical nature of SL: it
could happen that the all 100 are on the LHS, and you extract work from all of them; you
were just lucky. However on average, you cannot extract work.
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same as the state reached by isothermal compression if it is known where the
particle is (in contrast with what is assumed in premise 4 above), then the
entropy is path-independent.
We now compare the two paths quantitatively using the method defended by
Ladyman et al 2008, hereafter LPS, who show how to calculate the entropy
of a statistical mixture of definite thermodynamic states. They argue that
if a system is in one of two states with equal probability then the entropy
that should be assigned to the system is half the sum of the entropies asso-
ciated with those two definite states, plus a term of kln2 associated with the
uncertainty about in which state it is.
Initially the gas in the box has entropy X. The path taken by isothermal
compression is as follows: the piston is inserted then compression, entropy
of the gas reduced by kln2 (corresponding increase in the heat bath). The
gas is known to be on the RHS (for example) and can be used to do work on
the piston (by isothermal expansion).
The other path is as follows. The partition is inserted and the molecule is
either on the LHS or RHS. Using the formula above for the entropy of a
statistically mixed state the entropy of the gas is 1
2
(SL + Sr) + kln2, where
SL and SR are the well-defined thermodynamic entropies associated with
a gas trapped on one side (via isothermal compression). SL and SR are
X − kln2. After detecting which side of the partition of molecule is on, we
can then extract work from the system. Furthermore, according to the above
formula the entropy of the gas has reduced by kln2 (as there is no longer
any uncertainty and no entropy associated with this). This state is now the
same as the final state reached via isothermal compression. Therefore, again
it can be seen that inserting the partition is thermodynamically reversible
and, provided the true final states are considered, the entropy associated is
path-independent.8
8Note that this deals with Norton’s objections to the result of LPS (2008) which are
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5 Issues with the one-molecule gas
Norton argues that LP has not been proven, and thus that no link has been
established between logical and thermodynamical irreversibility. This link is
the foundation of the thermodynamics of computation which Norton claims is
a ‘spurious science’ (Norton 2012). According to him, the Landauer-Bennett
orthodoxy which is at the heart of the latter is unlikely ever to be estab-
lished because of the need to consider the effect of fluctuations in microscale
implementations of computations. Further, he claims that the treatment of
fluctuations including by LPSG is inconsistent. In the following section, we
consider Norton’s characterisation of processes at the the molecular level and
see that the treatment of fluctuations implicit in LPSG is not inconsistent
after all.9
5.1 Norton, the Second Law and the molecular scale
For Norton, the fact that molecules make up the macroscopic entities that
thermodynamics talks about ushers in violations of SL because he says “a
kinetic gas could, with very low probability, spontaneously recompress to a
much smaller volume, in contradiction with the second law of thermodynam-
ics” (2011, p. 185). Furthermore, he claims that Brownian motion is an
example of SL being violated on the molecular scale because he regards the
dancing of the pollen grains as a result of heat energy from the water being
converted into work (the motion of the pollen). This he claims even violates
the Kelvin formulation of SL (Norton 2012).
This perspective on processes at the molecular scale explains his discontent
precisely that the thermodynamic entropy is not well-defined for the states involved since
it he argues it is path-dependent, and that the processes used are inadmissible.
9Note there is no inherent reason that the thermodynamics of computation has to be
about the microscopic level. Rather, the motivation for considering small systems such as
one-molecule gases is to consider the lower limit on what is possible.
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with the partition process. Fluctuations cause the molecule to move from
one side of the box to another: inserting the partition is ‘locking’ in one of
these fluctuations. Why does Norton object to ‘locking in’ a fluctuation?
Accumulating and amplifying these microscopic violations is precisely how
a Maxwell’s demon would operate. Thus, Norton objects to processes that
‘lock in’ fluctuations to prove LP, given that LP is supposed (for example,
Blundell 2006) to help us escape from Maxwell’s demon.
According to Norton, the reason why we do not have to abandon SL, is
because ‘the microscopic violations’ of SL never accumulate to a macroscopic
difference. For example, we cannot harness the work done by the pollen grains
to drive a macroscopic change as they are moving in random directions.
So the molecular constitution of matter does not stop SL being true as an
emergent fact about macroscale processes.
However, Norton is mistaken. Firstly, a kinetic gas spontaneously compress-
ing to a smaller volume is not a violation of SL. It is overwhelmingly unlikely
to happen, as is throwing a fair coin and getting 1000 heads consecutively.
However, we do not think that 1000 heads violates the law of ‘head or tails
with 50/50 probability’. Unlikely events can happen. Further, it is a mis-
take to characterise brownian motion as a ‘thermodynamic fluctuation phe-
nomenon’ that violates SL. It is not that the ‘thermal energy’ of the water
that is being translated into ‘work done’ by the pollen grains jiggling. Rather,
some of the kinetic energy of the water molecules is transferred to the pollen
grains by collisions; this is entirely unmysterious. Heat and work are proper-
ties that belong to macroscopic entities, such as gases and heat baths, rather
than molecules or pollen grains.
But if Norton can’t talk about heat and work at the scale of pollen grains,
how can LSPG (and other proponents of LP) talk about one molecule gas
in a box doing work and exchanging heat with the heat bath? A molecule
in a box can be treated as an ideal gas. To treat 1000 molecules in a box as
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a gas (with constant pressure) you have to average over a short time. The
same reasoning applies to one molecule in a box, except for the behaviour to
count as a ‘gas’ you must average over a long(er) time. Thus, as it can be
treated as a gas, it is legitimate to talk about work and heat.
Further, the same mischaracterisation is the basis of the claim that inserting
a partition is ‘locking in’ a fluctuation. The molecule moving from one side to
the other is not a density fluctuation of the gas. This is a category mistake:
the molecule and the gas are not the same entity. The gas has a volume
equal to that of the box, whereas the molecule’s volume is minute (of the
order 10−33/m3). Moreover, the molecule moving from one side of the box,
colliding with the walls are part of it behaving like an ideal gas. If the
molecule remained in the same location for an extended period of time, it
would no longer be acting as an ideal gas. As such, the molecule moving
from one side to the other is not a fluctuation in the sense of a deviation
from equilibrium.
In the picture below are three different snapshots of the configuration of the
molecules in a gas. It is an error to draw the line around the molecules
(as shown) and claim that the ‘gas’ has a density fluctuation between the
different snapshots.
Figure 3: The different positions of molecules at three consecutive moments
of time
It is this mischaracterisation of thermal fluctuations at the molecular level
that seems to motivate Norton’s discontent with the processes employed by
LSPG: he thinks the processes proceed by fluctuations. As the movement of
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the molecule is seen as a density fluctuation, he thinks isothermal expansion
also proceeds by fluctuations. This is the basis of his claim that the ther-
modynamics of computation selectively ignores some fluctuations (such as
the position of the piston) but not others (density fluctuations of the gas).
Further, he thinks “that [it] is especially awkward since the one occasion on
which processes connected to fluctuations are not ignored is when the the-
ory treats the thermodynamics of erasure” (Norton 2012). However, we have
seen that this view stems from a mischaracterisation of the one-molecule gas.
All fluctuations are ignored, so the charge of inconsistency fails. Despite this,
whether the assumption that fluctuations can be ignored remains an open
question. In Norton (forthcoming) he claims that fluctuations fatally disrupt
processes at the molecular level. The Smoluchowski trapdoor fails because it
has to be light enough that a collision with a faster moving molecule would
open it but not a slower moving molecule, so it is in fact flapping about
wildly. Norton claims that the piston in an isothermal expansion would face
the same problem; it would be as likely to go from being in the middle of the
box to the end of the box via an isothermal expansion as via a fluctuation.
However, the piston could just be really heavy and the time taken for the
isothermal expansion could be very long.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that Norton’s critique of the proof of LP given by LPSG
fails. In particular, the processes they use do not violate the second law
of thermodynamics, and the cycle he constructs to perform ‘dissipationless
erasure’ requires a process that is not among those LPSG use and is inadmis-
sible, and when revised to be admissible the cycle reduces to reset of known
data which is not logically irreversible. Finally, the treatment of fluctuations
by LPSG is consistent and the response to Norton’s critique of LPSG also
counters his criticisms of the result of LPS. We have not addressed Norton’s
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most recent paper that criticises the whole science of the thermodynamics of
computation and that remains a subject for future work.
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